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ESSAY
FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE AND FREE SPEECH
THEORY
SUSAN H. WILLIAMS*
A great deal of attention in the last five years or so has
focused on feminist critiques of free speech law. These arguments
have centered primarily on issues like pornography, sexual harassment, and hate speech, in which the application of the legal doctrine to women's concerns is obvious and direct. Although I
believe that these debates are extremely important and I will
address some of these issues at the end of this essay, my emphasis
here will be on the connections between feminist theory and free
speech theory at a more general level.
Feminist theorists-in philosophy, history, sociology, and
literature, as well as in law-have posed a challenge to some of
the deepest assumptions of our culture about the nature of truth and
human knowledge. Many of these assumptions are part of the
foundations of present First Amendment legal theory. I would like
to explore with you the nature of this challenge and the ways in
which free speech theory and doctrine would be altered if we used
an alternative feminist epistemology as their basis.
Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that studies the
theory of knowledge. In other words, it asks about the nature of
truth, the components of knowledge, and the means by which
human beings can acquire it. For example, is all knowledge propositional-taking the form of declaratory sentences-or is it possible to know something that cannot be expressed in this wayT
Which human faculties are the best means of acquiring knowledge:
reason, emotion, or sense perception? And are some people,
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law. This essay was presented as a
public lecture as part of the Phelps Lecture series on the First Amendment at Tulane Law
School on November 17, 1993. I am grateful to the faculty of Tulane for their invitation to
speak and for their helpful comments and suggestions at a related faculty seminar.
1. See, e.g., MARraX C. NUJSSBAtrM, LOva's KNowLEDGE 3-10 (1990) (suggesting that
some knowledge is most accurately conveyed by literature or poetry rather than by propositional prose).
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because of their training or detachment or innate abilities, better
suited to the pursuit of knowledge than others? Obviously, these
sorts of issues have implications for law generally because part of
the purpose of legal institutions is to reach the truth on certain
issues. Thus, our view that emotion is unlikely to lead to reliable
knowledge causes us to adopt certain rules of evidence, such as the
exclusion of highly emotional evidence deemed likely to prejudice
a jury,2 and our view regarding the best characteristics for
truthfinders leads us to create specific training and institutional
restraints to maintain the detachment of judges.3
In free speech theory in particular, these epistemological
issues assume great importance. One of the oldest and most
widely accepted theories about why it is essential to protect free
speech relies on the role of speech in the search for truth. The
truth theory argues that only by allowing freedom of speech, and
the resulting clash of competing ideas, will human beings find the
truth. It is the effort to reconcile new ideas with old assumptions
that leads the listener to a clearer and more accurate perception of
the truth. The best known defenses of this position are by John
Milton4 and John Stuart Mill, 5 and the Supreme Court has
embraced this view with remarkable consistency. Indeed, this
argument seems to transcend both time and politics, finding favor
with Justices as different as Holmes,6 Brennan,7 and Rehnquist. 8
This truth theory of free speech relies, explicitly or implicitly,
on the mainstream tradition in Western epistemology, which I will
call Cartesianism. 9 Cartesianism is a collection of assumptions
that together form a vision of the nature of truth and human knowledge. In the Cartesian view, there exists an external and objective
reality that is accessible to individual knowers through the use of
2. For a general discussion of the gendered nature of evidence rules, see generally Aviva
Orenstein, Feminism and Evidence, in FEMINIST JURIsPRuDENcE PROJECr (1994) (manuscript

on file with author). For an analysis of the issues of relevance and prejudice in particular, see
Kit Kinports, Evidence Engendered, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 413, 430-34.
3. See generally Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574
(1987) (describing the removal of human emotions from the field of legal analysis and advocating the importance of empathetic knowledge).
4. See JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGrrcA (John W. Suffolk ed., Clarendon Press 1968)
(1644).

5.
6.
7.
8.

See
See
See
See

JOHN S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (D. Spitz ed., Norton 1975) (1859).
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 n.13 (1964) (Brennan, J.).
Milkovitch v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19 (1990) (Rehnquist, C.J.).

9. The discussion of Cartesianism that follows, as well as the feminist critique, are both

adapted from a more comprehensive consideration of these issues in Susan H. Williams, Feminist Legal Epistemology, 8 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 63, 64-75 (1993).
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their reason, perhaps combined with their sense perception. 10
Knowledge attained through this process is universally true, true
for all people, rather than merely true for a particular person in a
particular time and place." This traditional epistemology is so
widely accepted and so much a part of our social institutions that it
12
becomes extremely difficult even to imagine an alternative view.
I would like to explore each of the assumptions in Cartesianism and demonstrate how the truth theory in free speech law relies
on those assumptions. First, Cartesianism assumes that reality has
an objective nature. In other words, reality is simply there, and its3
nature is unaffected by whether we recognize or understand it.'
Second, Cartesianism posits that this objective reality is accessible
to human knowledge.' 4 These first two assumptions give rise to
the correspondence theory of truth, which is the dominant theory
about the nature of truth in Western philosophy and culture. 15 The
correspondence theory says that a proposition is true if16 and only if
it accurately describes the nature of objective reality.
Third, Cartesianism assumes that people engage in the work
of gaining knowledge as individuals, rather than as socially constituted members of particular groups.' 7 This type of individualism
means that the tools or characteristics necessary for the pursuit of
knowledge exist in individual human beings considered independently of the particular social context that they may inhabit. 18 For
example, people's use of their sensory organs arguably can be
understood without reference to their particular social context, but
their aesthetic sense cannot. Thus, sense data (such as whether an
object is red or blue) would qualify as facts that can be known, and
aesthetic judgments (for instance, whether the object is beautiful)
would be seen as matters of taste rather than matters of knowledge.
Fourth, Cartesianism assumes that the primary faculty through
which people acquire knowledge is their reason.' 9 Finally, for a
Cartesian, the knowledge attained through the proper exercise of
10. Id. at 64.
11. L
12. IL

13.
14.
15.
16.

Id at 65.
IL
Ia
Id

17. Id
18. d
19. Id
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these faculties is true for all people.20 There cannot be multiple or
competing truths; on any particular issue, only one truth exists. All
other perspectives are false due to varying degrees of failure to
reason or gather sense data properly. 21This assumption is called
universalism, or sometimes neutrality.
This Cartesian view of knowledge and truth can be seen in the
expositors of the truth theory in free speech law, as well as in the
Supreme Court opinions adopting that theory. Mill, for example,
in his famous defense of free speech in On Liberty, plainly
believed that people, at least some people, have access as individuals, despite their contrary culture, to an objective reality. This faith
is the foundation for his assertion that truth's real advantage over
falsity lies in the fact that regardless of how often the truth is suppressed, there will be people to rediscover it until it finds a setting
in which it can be freely aired.22 Moreover, Mill's position is
highly individualistic and rationalistic: it is not one's membership
in a particular culture that makes one a knower; rather, it is the
capacity to correct one's views through reason,23 a capacity Mill
ascribes to human beings individually and considered outside of
culture. 24 Indeed, the protection of the iconoclastic individual is
central to Mill's mission in On Liberty,2 as is his faith in the eventual progress of humanity toward universally recognized truths.26
Hints of these assumptions also underlie many of the Supreme
Court's uses of this theory. For example, the rationalist bias is
evident in the many references to speech as having lower value
when it is, as the Chaplinsky Court stated, "no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and [is] of such slight social value as a step to
truth." 27 Rationalism is even more explicitly embraced by Justice
Brandeis in his famous Whitney concurrence, when he attributed to
the framers a "[b]elie[f] in the power of reason as applied through
public discussion."28 The objectivist assumption-that truth
relates to some objective and accessible reality-is implicit in the
20.
21.
22.
As 401,
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
ruled by

Id. at 65-66.
Id. at 66.
See JoHN S. MiLu, ON LIBERry (New York, Holt 1859), reprintedin THE UmrrAU503 (Anchor Books 1973).
Il at 494.
Il at 495 ("No wise man ever acquired his wisdom in any mode but this.
Id. at 505-09.
Id. at 518.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overBrandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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Court's recent demand that a statement must be "provable as false
before there can be liability under state defamation law." 29 Finally,
the universalist assumption can be seen in Justice Holmes' oftenquoted assertion that "the best test of truth is the power of the
30
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market."
If truth were dependent on one's particular social context, then a
market would be a poor test of truth indeed. The success of any
particular idea would demonstrate only the prevalence of the social
factors leading to acceptance of that idea, nothing more. It is the
possibility that people, regardless of their particular positions, can
come to see the same reality, can become aware of a universally
valid truth, that makes the market useful, although still far from
31
foolproof, as a test of truth.
Although the truth theory is the focus of this essay, it is worth
noting that the other most prominent theory of free speech, the
democracy theory, shares, in many of its forms, much of this reliance on Cartesian epistemology. The democracy theory holds that
free speech is protected because it is essential to the proper functioning of a democracy. 32 Free and open discussion of issues is
indispensible to informed decisionmaking by the people, whether
their decisions are based on some utilitarian calculation about how
best to satisfy the preferences of a majority33 or on the search
for
34
some common good defined in a nonutilitarian manner.
In other words, the democracy theory views free speech as
valuable because it leads one to a clearer view of some political
truth, however defined. As long as that truth is seen as an objective thing, accessible to individuals through some process of reasoning, and true regardless of one's perspective, it shares the
characteristics of Cartesianism. Thus, the feminist challenge I am
29. Milkovitch v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19 (1990).
30. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
31. Let me quickly admit that the degree of commitment to this assumption varies
among those who have used the analogy. For example, Justice Holmes may have had only a
very weak universalist view given his pragmatist leanings, see Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and
Legal Pragmatism,41 STAN. L. REv. 787, 817 (1989), whereas Justice Brennan's view may
have been stronger. But I think it is the assumption of a basically Cartesian epistemology that
best makes sense of the Court's use of this marketplace metaphor over time.
32. See generally ALEx AERm Mmj.rmoNr, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATIoN TO SELFGovENnmrr (1948) (advocating unrestrained free speech as central to a democracy); ALExANDER M MKoLuN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960) (looking at the First Amendment as a comerstone of our democracy).
33. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47
IND. LJ. 1, 30-31 (1971).
34. See Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 255, 276 (1992).
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about to describe would be equally powerful against many of the
forms of democracy theory as well.35
The feminist critique has three basic contentions that, taken
together, challenge every aspect of Cartesianism. The first contention is that the creation of knowledge is a social activity that is
deeply shaped by the particular cultural context in which it occurs.
This social contruction becomes apparent when we look at each
stage in the process of acquiring knowledge. First, we must
choose an issue or question to examine. There is, however, no
such thing as a problem in need of study without people who have
the problem. 36 Which problems are studied will depend on whose
perspectives, concerns, and needs are considered important by
society. Evidence of this selection effect abounds when one examines society's inability even to name certain legal problems experienced by women until the categories of legal doctrine were
changed. For example, many harms suffered by working women
were unrecognized until the "discovery" of the phenomenon of
sexual harassment.37
Second, once we define the problem, we must collect facts or
evidence about it. Our experience does not, however, come to us
in preorganized sets; rather, facts are made by a process of selection from experience. What we notice and how we organize our
experience are both shaped by the conceptual categories that our
culture makes available to us. 38 One of the most striking illustrations of this phenomenon arises from the fact that a culture need
not give the same conceptual tools to all its members; indeed, in
our society there has been a great deal of gender differentiation.

35. The feminist critique might not, however, be as powerful against those forms of
democracy theory that focus on the value of participation itself rather than the truth produced
through the process of democratic participation. See BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG DEmocRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 150-55 (1984); WILLIAM SULuvAN, RECONSTRUCT-G PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 155-70 (1982); see also HANNAH ARNrDT, THE HUMAN
CONDmON 22-38 (1958) (tracing the history of the idea that the highest good lies in political
action).
36. See Sandra Harding, Introduction: Is There a Feminist Method?, in FEMINISM AND
METHODOLOGY 1, 6 (Sandra Harding ed., 1987).
37. See generally CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SExUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979) (tracking the emergence of sexual harassment as a legal problem).
38. See Naomi Scheman, Individualism and the Objects of Psychology, in DISCOvERING
REALITY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE ON EPISTEMOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS 225, 299 (Sandra Harding & Merrill B. Hintikka eds., 1983).
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For example, women may often be taught to notice and identify
39
subtle changes in emotional states, but men generally are not.
Finally, once we collect the data, we must interpret it. This
stage, too, is socially constructed in that interpretation inevitably
involves value choices. Data always underdetermine the theories
offered to explain them. In other words, there is always more than
one theory that could explain the data. To choose between the
alternative interpretations, one must rely, either implicitly or
explicitly, on a value judgment.
In traditional science, some value judgments are explicitly
acknowledged. For example, scientists will prefer the simpler or
more elegant of two alternatives. But we could make other
choices: we could prefer the theory that is most general or most
specific, most likely to produce human control over the phenomenon at issue or most likely to produce human respect for it, most
conducive to creating equality between the sexes or most conducive to maintaining gender hierarchy. To the extent that our value
judgments are shaped by our cultural context, so is our knowledge.
Thus, all the stages of knowledge gathering are permeated by
social forces. We have no unmediated access to any objective reality; our reality is made, not found, and it is made in culturally
specific ways.
The second contention of the feminist challenge grows out of
the first. The social construction of knowledge reintroduces emotion and value judgment as central to the process of acquiring
knowledge. They cannot be cabined, as the Cartesian would like,
because they are integral to the process of defining a problem, collecting data, and interpreting them. The refusal to recognize the
connection between emotion and values, on the one hand, and
knowledge, on the other hand, does not eliminate the impact of
emotion or values. It may, however, disguise the existing value
choices and thus immunize them from criticism.4 °
39. See generally MARY F. BEL_NKY ET AL., WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOwING: Tm
DEvELoPMENT OF SELF, VOICE AND MIND (1986) (describing the socialization of women and
its special emphasis on interpersonal relationships).
40. These value judgments also have important political, as well as moral, implications.
Different value choices may affect the social and political status of certain people, the sets of
rights or responsibilities that citizens enjoy, or the social and political institutions that seem
most appropriate for guaranteeing those rights and responsibilities. For example, scientific
claims that women suffer from a biologically limited capacity for reason would lead to clear
political results. Women's status would be reduced relative to men's. Women's "rights"
would be seen as primarily claims for care and protection, making the common analogy
between women and children intuitively appealing, and patriarchal family structures, sup-
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The third contention presented by the feminist challenge is a
direct attack on the universality assumption. Once we recognize
the impact of culture, values, and emotions on knowledge, it
becomes plain that knowledge may be situated rather than universal. The neutrality that looks for a view from nowhere is unattainable; it is certainly not attainable in every case, it may not be
attainable in any case. We .could be faced, then, with not one but
many equally valid interpretations of reality. Perspectives or
points of view must be recognized as potentially valid alternatives,
rather than as barriers or failures.
The feminist challenge offers the seeds of an alternative
approach to issues of truth and knowledge. The alternative sees
truth as socially constructed, inextricably connected to value judgments and emotions, and fundamentally perspectival. You may be
wondering at this point in what sense this alternative epistemology
is feminist. It may seem that the only feminist aspect of this
approach is the gender-based examples I have tried to use to illustrate it. In fact, it is true that feminist theorists share many aspects
of this epistemology with theorists from other perspectives, including members of two other current movements in legal theory:
pragmatism 4 ' and postmodernism. 42 There are, however, several
distinctive contributions that feminists have made to this approach
that make it fair to characterize this critique as feminist, along with
these other labels.
First, many feminists have argued that this alternative epistemology has generally been more accessible to women in Western
culture than to men. Women's traditional association with the
body, nature, emotion, and children 43 has led, the argument goes,
to a more particularized, contextual, emotional, and explicitly
value-laden method of reasoning. Some feminists have read Carol
Gilligan's work on women's moral reasoning as supporting this
position." They have found the causes of this difference in social
ported by economic and legal restrictions, would appear to be a very effective means of ensur-

ing that care and protection.
41. See generally Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1597 (1990) (discussing the problems associated with the use of pragmatism in feminist
theory); Margaret J. Radin, The Pragmatistand the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1699 (1990)
(addressing how feminism and pragmatism. can be used together).

42. See generally Symposium, Postmodernism and Law, 62 U. COLO. L. Rev. 439
(1991) (discussing various aspects of postmqdernism).
43. See Peggy R. Sanday, The Reproduction ofPatriarchyin FeministAnthropology, in
FEMINIST THOUGHT AND THE STRucTuRE OF KNOWLEDGE 49, 53 (Mary M. Gergen ed., 1988).

44. Gilligan's groundbreaking book, CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VoixC (1982),
has generated a cottage industry of commentary among feminist legal scholars. See, e.g.,
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conditioning,4 5 reproductive biology,46 or the practical experience
of mothering. 47 Many other feminists, however, have criticized

this argument as either mistaken or dangerous or both.4 8 The risks
of such gender-based characterizations are, I think, real and substantial. Nonetheless, there is an important insight in these arguments that should not be overlooked: this alternative
epistemological stance may be systematically more accessible to
some people based, among other things, on their gender.
Second, feminists have demonstrated how Cartesian epistemology has been used to maintain and justify gender hierarchy.
The Cartesian assumptions have formed the foundation for a series
of dichotomies-for example, reason/emotion, objective/subjective, universal/particular-that permeate not only philosophy and
law but Western culture more generally. These dichotomies have
then been used to construct gender identity, with the valued half
ascribed to men and the dangerous half ascribed to women. 49 The
result is a system in which gender hierarchy is analogized to
knowledge: just as the knower exerts power over the known, men
control and exert power over women. The important point for our
purposes is that to adopt Cartesianism, and thereby prefer one side
of the dichotomies to the other, is to reinforce an existing unequal
distribution of power along gender lines.
Thus, one sense in which this critique is feminist is that it is
explicitly
committed to recognizing and redressing gender inequality.50 However, it also goes beyond being merely feminist by
showing the connection between Cartesianism and other social
hierarchies, such as race and class, that also have been supported
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portiain a Different Voice: Speculations on a Woman's Lawyering
Process, 1 BERKELEY WoMEN's L.J. 39, 39-49 (1985); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the
Feminine Voice in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 543, 570 (1986); Joan C.

Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797, 802-16, 840-42 (1989).
45.

See generally NANCY J. CHODOROW, FEMINISM AND PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY

(1989) (describing the socialization of women and the resulting differences between the gen-

ders' reasoning methods).
46. Although ambiguous on this point, some of Robin West's work can be read as relying on a biological basis for these differences. See, e.g., Robin West, Jurisprudenceand Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 20-25 (1988).
47. See generally SARA RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING: TOWARD A POLITICS OF PEACE
(1989) (discussing mothering and the thought processes that spring from it).
48. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 44, at 803-06.
49. See Elizabeth Fee, Critiques of Modem Science: The Relationship of Feminist to
Other Radical Epistemologies, in Fmmasr APPROACHES TO SCIENCE 42, 47 (Ruth Bleier ed.,
1986).
50. See Deborah L. Rhode, The "No Problem" Problem: Challenges and Cultural
Change, 100 YALE LJ. 1731, 1735-36 (1991).
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by reliance on similar dichotomies. Ideally, then, the critique
begins with a feminist insight and moves on to a condemnation of
social oppression more generally. It still is feminist, but it also has
the potential for broader application.
Let us return now from epistemology to free speech theory.
What would this alternative approach mean for First Amendment
theory and doctrine? First of all, we must deal with the objection
that this very different conception of truth and knowledge may
raise doubts about the continued vitality of the truth theory as a
whole. Once truth is redefined in this way, it is not immediately
clear why we should view it as so valuable as to justify the free
speech guarantee. In other words, if truth does not mean coherence with an external reality, why should we want it? A full
answer to this question is not possible here, but I can at least suggest the outlines of a response.
In this alternative epistemology, truth and knowledge grow
out of and form the basis for a shared social life. As such, they are
the foundation for a whole range of human goods, none of which is
possible without that shared life-goods like friendship, community, and love, but also goods like self-respect, comfort, and safety.
One goal of this new epistemology is to ensure the widest possible
participation in this shared life. The ability to participate in the
process of knowledge formation is one guarantee of being a part of
this shared social life, and exclusion from it is a kind of internal
exile. A second goal of this epistemology is to provide the conditions under which such a shared life is possible. Without a process
of knowledge formation, a society could not long sustain the
shared life on which so much depends. That is why, under this new
epistemology, truth is still desirable both for individuals and for
societies and is still important enough to justify a fundamental constitutional right.
In addition, it is important to recognize that, for the purposes
of the First Amendment, this epistemology does not need to allow
us actually to identify the truth, or truths, on any given issue.
Instead, it needs to explain the role of speech in the search for this
new kind of truth. If truth is constructed, evaluative, and perspectival, then why is speech important to truth?
In order to appreciate the function of speech, we have to look
at the dangers of this alternative epistemology. If all truth is perspectival, then consider the position of the critic who wants to
challenge her own culture, for example a feminist critic. It seems
that this critic is likely to find herself trapped on the horns of a
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dilemma. 5 1 The first possibility is that her culture is consistent, in
which case her criticism seems to have no foundation at all
because there are no standards for truth, knowledge, or judgment to
which she can appeal outside of that culture. She must always
operate from inside her cultural context. She may, therefore, be
left only with a simple moral conventionalism that is inadequate to
her critique.
The second possibility is that her culture is not consistent, that
it contains strands and themes that would support her critique
alongside strands that would reject it. In this case, however, if
there is nothing beyond culture to appeal to, there may well be
conflicts that are simply unresolvable-conflicts where all one can
say is, "Well that's your perspective and this is mine." This kind
of relativism is, however, also inadequate for a feminist critic. At
a minimum, feminists must be able to say that gender oppression is
wrong, not simply that their perspective on it is one valid perspective among many.52
Both of these unacceptable positions arise from the same difficulty: if all knowledge is culturally situated, how can people ever
come to common ground when they begin in different cultural contexts? How do we persuade each other? And how do we each
individually learn and change? Speech can, of course, be one
answer to these questions.
At one time or another, most people have had the experience
of being persuaded by someone about a matter of importance to
them. They have listened to someone else's perspective, realized
the limitations of their own views, and changed their position on
some issue of moral significance. When speech works, in
instances like these, how does it work? Well, to begin with, it
depends on the positions of the speaker and the listener. If they are
not open to each other's views, if their minds are closed, then no
such dialogue can take place. Similarly, if they are not honest,
emotionally and intellectually, and willing to engage in self-criticism, then they will not have the flexibility to respond to challenges with change. Finally, if they are too insistent on unity and
51. For a fuller statement of this dilemma, see Williams, supra note 9, at 83-89.
52. The need to be able to make such a claim should not drive the feminist critic back to

the abstract foundationalism of the Cartesian. It does, however, require that she be able to find
some cross-perspective basis for judgment. This essay considers the process through which
such judgment might be reached. For an attempt to specify the content of such judgments, see
DRUCaLLA CORNELL, Bs'YoND ACCOMODATION: ETHicAL FEMINSM, DECONSTRUCrON, AND
TH

LAW (1991); see also Martha C. Nussbaum, Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian

Approach, 13 MDw-sT STuD. PHI%. 32, 34-36, 48-49 (1988).
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uniformity, then they may not recognize a different point of view
when they see it, but will simply analogize it to their own perspective and miss the chance for challenge and growth.
These necessary characteristics of speaker and listener are
understandable in terms of the alternative epistemology that I have
been describing. If truth is fundamentally perspectival, then we
must be sensitive to the differences between us, aware of the need
to recognize diversity as well as similarity, and cautious about generalizing beyond particular situations. If value and emotion are
central to the search for knowledge, then we must be open to persuasion on all these levels and not just through the mechanism of
some instrumental reason. And if knowledge is socially constructed, then we must be honest and self-aware, searching for the
foundations of our own assumptions and reexamining them in light
of what we hear from others.53
In a sense, this new epistemology offers a model of truth in
which the ultimate test is not some objective reality but rather a
notion of personal integrity. In this alternative epistemology, truth
is not so much a characteristic of propositions as it is a characteristic of the persons who hold them. That is, for a belief to be true
simply means that the person
who holds it has adopted a certain
54
it.
to
respect
with
position
Speech is one of the ways in which we can construct this new
kind of truth together. Listening to the speech of others makes us
more aware of the diversity of views and the limitations of our own
perspectives, provides an opportunity to learn openness on all
levels, and gives us the materials for self-criticism. Our own
speech allows us to contribute to this process of cultural construction and actually to practice honest self-criticism. Thus, speech is
a way of pursuing this new truth. Indeed, this model of dialoguein which the participants come together to create an understanding
that neither possessed alone 55-surely is one of the great hopes
and promises of speech. It captures part of the free speech ideal
that has long been implicit in our understandings but was never
able to be adequately explained by a Cartesian epistemology.
53. Recognition of the socially constructed nature of our knowledge demands this struggle for critical distance in order to prevent this epistemology from deteriorating into simple
conventionalism.
54. This may be why Katherine Bartlett describes her theory as "positionality." Katherine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. REv. 829, 880-81 (1990).

55. This model might also form the foundation for a reconstructed Socratic method. See
Susan Williams, Legal Education, Feminist Epistemology and the SocraticMethod, 45 STAN.

L. R v. 1571, 1574-76 (1993).
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Let me offer a few examples of what this approach might
mean for First Amendment theory and doctrine. First of all, we
would hear no more about speech that is like an "inarticulate
grunt" and "no essential part of any exposition of ideas," as Chief
Justice Rehnquist characterized flag burning. 6 These attitudes
arise from the rationalist bias of Cartesianism. Once we recognize
that emotional, highly personal, and value-laden speech is also part
of the process of reaching knowledge, we would have to grant it
full First Amendment protection.
Second, some of the excluded or lower value categories of
speech would be explained in new and interesting ways. For
instance, commercial speech, speech that proposes a commercial
transaction, like advertising,57 does not usually contribute to the
kind of dialogue that I am describing. It generally does not call on
either the speaker or the listener for the kind of openness to other
perspectives and honest self-examination through which knowledge is acquired. 58 It is, therefore, generally less deserving of First
Amendment protection, at least with respect to the First Amendment's purpose of promoting the search for truth. 9
Another important implication of this alternative model of
truth is that speech does not always serve the purpose of facilitating the search for truth. Under certain conditions, speech is less
likely to work in the ways that I have described and, if the value of
truth is what justifies the special protection for speech, we are less
justified in extending this protection to speech under such conditions. For example, under conditions in which the diversity we
need for knowledge-seeking is squelched and challenging voices
are excluded, the special protection for speech loses much of its
appeal in a feminist epistemology. If we believe that the mass
media is an example of such a sanitized and homogeneous speech
market, we should consider regulations that would increase access
56. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 430-32 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
57. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 762 (1976).
58. It is not impossible that an advertisement could involve this use of speech, but given
the pressures of the market, it is unlikely. This approach would, therefore, call on courts to
make a delicate judgment about the function of the speech. They must already make such a
judgment, of course, in determining whether something is commercial speech at all. See
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65-68 (1983).
59. This approach also helps to explain why nonpropositional speech, like some art
forms, is fully protected. Truth is no longer a matter of facts about certain subjects, but a
matter of the interaction between speaker and listener. It therefore becomes easily understandable how nonpropositional speech may contribute to truth by leading people to interact in
relevant ways.
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for those generally denied a hearing, either because of their lack of
resources or the unpopularity of their message or both. A feminist
version of the truth theory might, in other words, lend additional
support to the call for access rights.60
Finally, we would recognize that many free speech issues
must be resolved in light of the particular contexts in which they
arise. Hate speech cases, for example, arise in a range of very
different settings, from the public streets to workplaces to universities and schools, both public and private. These varied contexts
and the different people who inhabit them should be central to our
analysis because speech that can serve the search for this new kind
of truth in one setting may not do so in another.
I would like to explore the issue of hate speech in a little more
detail in order to illustrate the approach I am suggesting. There
have been many arguments made on both sides assessing the constitutionality of hate speech regulations under existing interpretations of the Free Speech Clause. I would like to suggest the
outlines of a hate speech analysis informed by this feminist truth
theory of free speech. My hope is that this analysis illuminates
concerns obscured by a more traditional approach and frames the
issues in a way that leads to more fruitful discussion.
First, I do not think it is possible to deny that hate speech has
prima facie First Amendment value, even under this feminist epistemology. Hate speech presents a perspective that poses a tremendous challenge. It shocks us into a reconsideration of our own
assumptions, about ourselves and about the community in which
we live. The fact that it represents a perspective which must be
rejected on substantive moral and political grounds does not alter
its effectiveness as speech that produces the position of truth and
plays a role in the community's construction of social reality. Perhaps the best way to see this is to contrast hate speech with commercial speech, which is often lacking in this prima facie value.
The recognition of this value does not, however, end the analysis. Hate speech cases arise in a range of very different settings.
Consider the example of a college campus to illustrate how the
context may add to the analysis. The particular setting of a college
campus provides several arguments for regulation of hate speech
that would not apply, at least not with the same force, in the setting
of a traditional public forum like a street or a park. The special
60. See Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New FirstAmendment Right, 80
HARv. L. REv. 1641, 1650-53 (1967).
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vulnerability of the student population-young, often cut off from
normal sources of family and community support, often engaged in
a critical stage of identity formation-means that the harmful
6
impact of the speech on its targets is likely to be intensified. 1
Moreover, the function of an educational institution of higher
learning is to prepare students to be productive and responsible
members of a democratic society. There are strong arguments that
this purpose is seriously compromised by the presence of hate
speech on campus.6 2 Regardless of one's ultimate stance on the

particular balance at issue here, the point is that a feminist epistemology would lead us to examine the issue of hate speech in a
highly contextual fashion, not to expect some blanket answer to
whether such regulations are constitutional that would apply in all
times and places.63
Notice, however, that the arguments to which I just referred
are primarily directed toward explaining why the state interest in
regulation is stronger or more compelling in the university setting
than in other situations. These arguments do not directly dispute
the case for the prima facie truth value of such speech; they merely
point out that that value may be outweighed in some contexts.
There is a further argument possible under this feminist truth theory, however, which says that context affects not only the countervailing state interest but also the First Amendment value of the
speech itself.
This argument points out that the ability of speech to serve the
purpose of this search for truth depends on the existence of certain
conditions. In particular, when the voices of those harmed by hate
speech are systematically silenced, the opportunity to search for
common ground and to move forward together is lost, and along
with it, much of the truth value of this speech. Moreover, there is
reason to believe that the hate speech itself may be partly responsible for this silencing effect. Once again, however, the impact may
61. See Charles R. Lawrence I, If He Hollers Let Him Go: RegulatingRacist Speech
on Campus, 1990 Dutn

LJ. 431,458-66; Mar J. Matsuda, PublicResponse to Racist Speech:

Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 2320, 2370-72 (1989).
62. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Racial Insults and Free Speech Within the University, 79
GEO. LJ. 399, 417-23 (1991); Rodney A. Smolla, Rethinking FirstAmendment Assumptions
About Racist and Sexist Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 171, 177-78 (1990).
63. Indeed, even this analysis may not be sufficiently context sensitive because universities may be collections of smaller contexts, some of which deserve to be treated as public fora
(e.g., a bulletin board) and some of which should not (e.g., a classroom or dormitory). See
Alan E. Brownstein, Regulating Hate Speech at Public Universities: Are FirstAmendment
Values FunctionallyIncompatible with Equal ProtectionPrinciples?, 39 BuFF. L. REv. 1, 44-

47 (1991).
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vary with the circumstances. For example, the silencing effect of
hate speech may be particularly severe in employment settings in
which the targets of the speech often are extremely isolated and
economically vulnerable. The silencing effect may be real but less
severe in the college campus context and, perhaps, even less severe
in a traditional public forum, such as a street or a park. If hate
speech causes this silencing effect, then it forfeits some of its claim
to First Amendment value, but how much of the value is lost may
well be a matter that can only be determined in a very contextspecific way.
Indeed, the recognition that speech, and hate speech in particular, can fail to lead to this new truth, depending on conditions,
should lead to the further realization that speech is at most only an
imperfect and second-best means to this goal. The best way for
people to come together, reach understanding and forge common
ground is to share life experiences, to be colleagues, neighbors,
and friends. It is shared life that is the most effective mechanism,
but that of course is no solution to our epistemological dilemma.
We cannot, after all, share life with all the people in our large
republic with whom we must decide issues of public policy. Nor
would we wish to homogenize society so thoroughly that we all
have the same experiences and could thus rely on common
assumptions. So in the absence of this shared life or common
experience, we must rely on less perfect, but more realizable,
mechanisms like speech to bridge our differences.
One conclusion we might draw from this realization that
speech is second-best is that we must resist the deification of
speech. Free speech is one value in a free and just society, a very
important value, but not the only one nor necessarily even the most
important one. There are other values that a free society should
also cherish, values like equality, nondomination, and compassion.
And these values may, under some circumstances, come into conflict with speech.
I believe that this is the situation we face not only with hate
speech but also with certain attempts to regulate pornography
because of the harm that it does to women. Free speech is not cost
free and the controversy over these regulations is a painful
reminder of that fact. There is strong and disturbing evidence that
the prevalence of pornography in our society takes its toll not only
on the self-esteem and sense of safety of almost all women but also
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on the bodies and even the lives of some women. 64 And yet the
pornography debate sometimes proceeds as if the advocates of free
speech cannot see the very real costs of this speech, and the advocates of regulation cannot see the equally real costs of
suppression.6 5
I do not believe that the First Amendment resolves this tragic
value choice for us. We must face it squarely as a matter of politics and culture. When we do, we may decide that this is an
instance in which other values are more important than free
speech. If we do that, I think it is essential that we not try to pretend that we are doing no violence to the free speech ideal. We are
sacrificing some free speech, but that may be appropriate, because
after all, free speech is not necessarily the highest good. We may,
on the other hand, decide that free speech is worth those costs
which we will inevitably bear if we do not allow government the
power to control culture in this way. But if we reach that conclusion, I think it is essential that again we recognize the costs with
open eyes. We should not pretend that nothing of value has been
lost, that no one has really been hurt. People are too apt to become
disillusioned by their ideals when they discover that those ideals
have real costs. Only if we acknowledge those costs and face
those tragic choices 66 will we be prepared for the constant process
of choosing and rechoosing that a free society requires.
But there is another way to approach such tragic choices.
This approach asks about the conditions that make the clash of
values so painful and irresolvable. For example, in the hate speech
context, a feminist epistemology encourages us to look at the
social background from which this phenomenon takes its meaning
and the reality which it in turn shapes. Hate speech is so dangerous precisely because of the existence of deep inequality and injustice along particular lines in our society. When someone
disparages another because of hair color, for instance, that speech
simply is incapable of causing the same degree of pain or silencing
64. See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 127-213 (1987). See generally ANDREA DWORI.N, PoRNoRA"Hy: MEN PossEssING WomEN (1981) (discussing harm-

ful social effects of pornography).
65. See generally Nadine Strossen, A Feminist Critique of "The" Feminist Critique of
Pornography,79 VA. L. REv. 1099 (1993) (arguing that women's rights are harmed by censorship of pornography).
66. It is a tragic choice because something of real value will be lost either way and
because, in making such choices, we must recognize the vulnerability of our own virtues to
and the shaping of our own characters by circumstances beyond our control. See MARTHA C.
NussBAUM, THE FRAriorrY oF GOODNESs 32-47 (1986).
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as hate speech because it does not take place against the background of massive social prejudice that exists respecting race, gender, and certain other categories in our culture. This means that
when we protect hate speech, we are asking those who have
already been made most vulnerable by these social practices of inequality to bear the costs of this speech as well.
If we believe both that this speech has First Amendment value
and that this allocation of the burden is an outrage and an injustice,
then we appear to be faced with another tragic choice. This examination of the social background, however, suggests that there is a
third way out. We could commit ourselves to take greater responsibility for changing the underlying conditions of inequality that
make the speech so damaging. This commitment must mean a
widespread, serious, active, and immediate program of social
reform. By connecting speech explicitly to our joint construction
of a social reality, a feminist epistemology makes plain the relationship between the protection of speech and other
responsibilities.
It is, I think, in part because of a tremendous sense of despair
over the American public's unwillingness to bear this responsibility that many advocates have turned to the more dramatic, but ultimately less useful, tactic of silencing hate speech. And they may
be right that, in the absence of the political will to correct the
underlying injustice, the burden of that injustice should not be
borne by those made most vulnerable by prejudice and inequality.
I believe that the debates over hate speech and pornography, therefore, pose a challenge to all of us who find ourselves concerned
about the values of free speech. If one listens with an open mind, I
think it is impossible not to hear the real pain caused by hate
speech and pornography. If, after hearing that, we still believe that
it is more important to protect this speech from regulation than to
protect these people from harm, then we should accept the challenge to show the depth of our commitment to speech by also
undertaking a commitment to end the inequalities that make this
speech so hurtful. Without that commitment to equality, the protection of hate speech or pornography simply becomes an easy way
to cast the burdens of speech onto someone else. If this speech is
really that important, we ought to be willing to bear the burdens of
it ourselves. Thus, the cost of free speech in such contexts should
be a deep and sincere commitment to the social change necessary
for equality.
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This very brief sketch of the implications of a feminist epistemology for free speech theory has, I hope, demonstrated several
things. First, despite what may appear from current debates on
some of these issues, a feminist approach to free speech law is not
inevitably restrictive of speech rights. Indeed, with respect to
some topics not usually addressed by feminist theorists, like access
rights to mass media, it may even expand speech rights beyond the
scope of present doctrine. Second, the challenge posed by feminist
theory arises from a foundation much deeper and wider than any
one area of speech, like pornography. The epistemological critique
requires a serious reconsideration of the concepts of truth and
knowledge on which not only free speech law but law generally
relies. And finally, this challenge calls us to face some of the difficult issues in modem free speech theory by realizing that the great
hope for speech-that it can bring us together and forge a common
ground from which we can go forward-is only possible if we are
willing to open our minds and hearts and accept the responsibility
for this social world that we make together.
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